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COFFIN’S COURT: A COLLEAGUE’S VIEW
The Honorable Levin Campbell*
I. JOINING THE COFFIN COURT
These reminiscences focus on the eleven years, from 1972 to 1983, that Frank
M. Coffin of Maine was the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit. While Coffin’s judicial career extended over more than forty
years, I chose this period because it was a time when his influence over the court’s
work was at its peak, as well as because he himself later singled it out as a “judicial
Garden of Eden,”1 during which the First Circuit enjoyed its status as the last
remaining three-judge federal court of appeals in the nation.
I was appointed from Massachusetts in 1972 to become one of the First Circuit
Court’s three active judges. By then, Judge Coffin had served on the court for six
and a half years, together with former Chief Judge Bailey Aldrich from
Massachusetts, and Judge Edward McEntee from Rhode Island. At age 65, Judge
Aldrich had just resigned as an “active” judge—effectively disqualifying himself
from further service as chief judge. But as a senior judge, he would still be able to
hear cases and perform most other judicial functions, as he fully intended to do. In
his place, Judge Coffin had become Chief, and I, taking Judge Aldrich’s active
judgeship slot, was the First Circuit’s third regular judge.
The court I joined in 1972 was one of then eleven federal appellate courts from
around the country created to hear and decide appeals from decisions of federal
district courts and from certain administrative and other federal tribunals. Except
for the relatively few cases the United States Supreme Court took for further
review, we and our sister courts were the final arbiters of federal appeals within our
respective jurisdictions. With just a trio of authorized judges—a single hearing
panel—the First Circuit was the smallest federal appeals court anywhere. Our
jurisdiction included appeals from the district courts of Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Puerto Rico.
My memory of initial meetings with Judge Coffin is of a courteous, slender,
friendly man who displayed a kindly interest in helping me settle into my new
judicial role. His quiet, unassuming manner and compact size would not have
inspired Hollywood to select him to play the movie role of the stereotypical chief
judge. Later in life, he playfully described judges who presented that kind of
image. Regarding Judge John D. Clifford, for whom he had clerked at the
beginning of his legal career, and whom he deeply loved and respected, he wrote:
“[Clifford] was a massive man . . . . He was prognathous man incarnate . . . . He
didn’t walk. He lumbered. His gravelly voice rose from a very deep cavern
within.”2 And after riding in an elevator with the legendary Learned Hand, Coffin
* Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. For their helpful
comments after reading a draft, I thank Susannah Barton Tobin and Professor Frank E. A. Sander. For
his excellent research assistance, I thank Josh Podoll.
1. FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 215 (2004).
2. 2 FRANK M. COFFIN, LIFE AND TIMES IN THE THREE BRANCHES 233 (2004) [hereinafter LIFE
AND TIMES: VOLUME 2].
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commented: “Like Judge Clifford, he was a man of bulk with great bushy
eyebrows. They seemed to fill the elevator to capacity.”3
Coffin’s modest physique and appearance did not lend themselves to imagery
like that. But what he lacked in bulk, he made up for in quiet leadership,
kindliness, good sense, and humor—qualities that drew people to him and quickly
elicited respect. Some of his qualities might be associated with the quintessential
Yankee—he was sensible, prudent, well-organized, a very hard worker—but
certainly not a Yankee of the cold, self-righteous variety. Rather, one might
imagine him at the country store, swapping tales (he was a good listener), telling
jokes laced with his own special brand of absurdity, greeting neighbors, and
inquiring about a friend who needed a helping hand. His leadership style was that
of a consensus builder, a fact he himself recognized in his memoirs. Writing about
chairing Harvard Law School’s Board of Student Advisors while at law school, he
stated:
[T]he most significant contribution of my work for the Board lay in my year-long
experience in participating, then exercising a consensus-producing leadership of
peers in a collegial organization. I had wet my feet in this kind of work as a
member, officer, then President of the Bates Student Council. Time and time
again I was to find myself working on important matters in a group situation, then
being elevated to a position of catalyst, planner, coordinator, leader. I look back
with deep satisfaction on this kind of work in community affairs, in political party
building, in service on Congressional and judicial committees, in creating new
organizations. I like to think it has been a leadership not stemming from power
4
but from the persistent stimulation of shared motivation and consensus.

While in the above comment Judge Coffin related his consensus-building
leadership to service on “judicial committees,” he displayed the same kind of
leadership when serving as Chief Judge of the First Circuit—a role in which he had
outstanding success. He later wrote enthusiastically about his eleven years spent as
Chief Judge: “I willingly invested all my energies in the job,” he said, “taking pride
in the part I was privileged to play in making our system of law and justice work as
well as possible. I look back on my tenure with satisfaction and even affection.”5
It is hard to imagine a position more suited to leadership of a consensus-building
sort than that of chief judge. A chief judge, unlike a CEO or military leader, is first
among equals. Selected by seniority of commission, he or she needs the
cooperation of fellow-judges—the very sort of voluntary support Coffin excelled in
nurturing.
Coffin went on to play to perfection the part of our chief judge. Under him,
the First Circuit was a happy court; he provided sensible and effective leadership
that left an imprint lasting for many years after he had ceased being its chief.
During his time as our chief, and indeed in the years immediately before that,
the First Circuit’s appellate docket grew tremendously. For the tiny court as then
constituted to keep deciding the mounting volume of cases with reasonable
3. Id. at 239.
4. Id. at 222.
5. 3 FRANK M. COFFIN, LIFE AND TIMES IN THE THREE BRANCHES 97 (2010) [hereinafter LIFE AND
TIMES: VOLUME 3].
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promptness (which it continued to do), the small complement of judges and staff
had to work hard. One of Judge Coffin’s first efforts as chief judge was to write a
lengthy letter to Judge McEntee and me, noting that since he had come onto the
bench in 1965, the caseload had more than doubled “and that our big challenge was
to preserve the quality of reflection while keeping up with the work.”6 The First
Circuit’s reputation within the legal community remained high throughout this
period, and its affirmance rate by the Supreme Court was the highest in the Nation.7
Throughout his chief judgeship, Coffin heard and participated in deciding
substantially the same number of appeals as the rest of us—contrary to circuit court
chiefs’ more usual custom of taking fewer cases in order to compensate for the
extra time devoted to administrative duties. Having Coffin as both a colleague and
a chief judge during this time of growth and expansion was a boon to his fellow
judges and those served by the court.
Coffin remained chief judge until 1983, at which time he relinquished that
office and continued as a regular member of the court. Next in seniority, I became
his successor as chief. His departure was crowned by a party hosted by family,
friends, and clerks that featured a song sung by Judge Aldrich to the tune of “Mack
the Knife”:
Levin Campbell, Bailey Aldrich,
Stephen Breyer, Hughie Bownes,
All salute their parting Chief dear;
8
May he long be back in town.

Coffin could have stayed on longer, having been “grandfathered” from
compliance with the seven-year term limit for chief judges Congress imposed in
1978.9 However, he told me and Judge Breyer—our fourth judge, appointed in
1980—that, particularly in light of that legislation, he wanted to pass along the
position of chief judge to others.
Additionally, feeling the pressure of
administrative duties caused by the court’s growth, he wanted more time for
judicial and other non-administrative tasks.10 He expected me to serve for seven
years, as I did until 1990. Judge Breyer, who followed me as chief, served for
fewer years before leaving in 1994 to become a Justice of the Supreme Court.
Because the volume of appeals within the First Circuit grew steadily during the
Coffin years, Congress authorized an increase of judges on the Court of Appeals to
four in 1978, and to six in 1984. Congress also increased the number of judges on
the district courts from which appeals to us came, reflecting a circuit-wide growth
in caseload. The number of judges on the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico went from two to six, in response to a surge in that court’s
caseload following its creation in 1966 as Puerto Rico’s first federal district court

6. Id. at 99.
7. See THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysis.php (last visited Feb. 15,
2011) (forty-one percent of the First Circuit decisions that went to the Supreme Court from 1972 to
1983 were affirmed; the next highest circuit was the Second Circuit, at thirty-nine-point-eight percent
affirmed).
8. LIFE AND TIMES: VOLUME 3, supra note 5, at 167.
9. Id. at 164.
10. Id. at 165, 169.
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modeled on those in the nation’s fifty states. Previously, Puerto Rico had had a
special court system of its own related to the Island’s colonial status—a system that
had generated relatively few appeals to the First Circuit. But within several years,
appeals from Puerto Rico’s new District Court were second in number only to
those from the District of Massachusetts. Meanwhile, judgeships in the Districts of
Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island all went from one to two. District court
growth added logistical and oversight responsibilities to Judge Coffin’s
administrative plate.
As earlier said, administrative changes, as well as additional staff, were
required to cope with the increase in the First Circuit’s caseload and other
responsibilities. Appeals lacking in merit or easy to decide, for example, needed to
be identified and disposed of quickly, so as to leave time for the judges to wrestle
with more difficult appeals. In 1978, Judge Coffin hired our Circuit’s first staff
attorney, soon to be followed by more. Their functions came to include screening
and drafting memos and proposed opinions in cases not needing a hearing, as well
as assisting with interlocutory matters. Judge Coffin, with the help of Dana Gallup,
our clerk, and in consultation with the other judges, led in devising these remedies.
Because the number of judges was small, and our relationships under Coffin were
close, administrative changes in those days could be quickly considered and made,
with a minimum of people to consult. A photograph entitled “The Smallest Active
Court (in Judge Campbell’s Cockpit)” shows graphically how small we were. It
portrays Judge Coffin, Judge Bownes, and me on my sailboat in Boston Harbor, in
the late 1970s.11
Coffin’s later writings make it clear how much he valued, and would like to
have retained, the then existing informality and intimacy of the small court.
Writing in 1980, Coffin said, “I am by no means certain that the working
relationships we have enjoyed on our court for at least the last decade and a half are
typical of courts with three to five times as many judges [referring to other circuits
around the country] . . . . Congress has authorized a fourth judge, and I suspect that
a few years hence we shall be a court of seven or more.”12 Writing a decade later,
when the court had six judges, he reminisced about the agreeableness of sitting for
his first fifteen years on the bench with a court “the same size as when it was
created in 1891. There was no precedent created in which all of us did not
participate.”13 He sadly compared this “judicial Garden of Eden” with the prospect
of sitting with each colleague “only once or twice or even three times a year.”14
I never realized the extent of Judge Coffin’s concerns regarding growth until I
read the above remarks, and others like them, in his subsequent writings. His
liking for a small, intimate court was doubtless encouraged by values found in his
home state of Maine, where the neighborliness of an older America lingered. He
drew sustenance from the network of human relationships that, growing up,
surrounded him in Lewiston and, in later years, throughout Maine, where he was
well known and, in many circles, beloved. He disliked big, impersonal institutions
11. Id. at 121.
12. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE
BENCH 172 (1980).
13. ON APPEAL, supra note 1, at 215.
14. Id. at 216.
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and bureaucracies. He wanted the time and opportunity to cultivate and maintain
one-on-one human relationships. He feared what might happen as the First Circuit
grew and its judges lost the personal ties that the small court he had served for a
decade and a half afforded. Writing towards the end of his life, he expressed
disappointment that, during his senior judge years, as a result of the court’s growth,
“[he] found [his] opportunities to sit with and know better [his] judicial brethren
and sister were very seldom . . . . [T]he kind of collegiality that stemmed from
close and steady sitting in Boston and Puerto Rico, conferring, corresponding, and
lunching together gradually diminished.”15
But while Coffin preferred the intimate relationships of the First Circuit’s
halcyon years when still a three-judge court, his many accomplishments before he
became a judge, as well as thereafter, showed how well he could also perform on a
larger stage. His career prior to his appointment to the First Circuit is a story of
extraordinary advancement and success not only in Maine but at Harvard, in
Washington, and in Europe. He had attended Bates College, a small, liberal arts
college of national repute, located in the same town of Lewiston in which he grew
up. His academic record there was brilliant, and he was president of the student
council and a champion college debater on a team that achieved statewide
prominence. His greatest success, one of the few he was always happy to talk
about, was his marriage to another Bates student, Ruth Ulrich, his companion and
closest friend throughout life. They were already married when, upon his return
from naval service in the Pacific during World War II, he attended Harvard Law
School. Grades near the very top of his class resulted in his appointment to the
Law School’s Board of Student Advisors, of which he soon became chairman. He
graduated from Harvard Law School cum laude.
Coffin returned to Maine to clerk for the state’s sole federal district judge,
Judge John D. Clifford, and, notwithstanding a job offer from a prestigious Boston
firm, elected to practice law in Lewiston. His reputation and law practice grew
rapidly; he also served in municipal government posts and taught a course in
Evidence at the Portland University Law School (since absorbed into the
University of Maine School of Law). An accomplished and, when called for,
humorous speaker, he was often invited to address local gatherings. Several years
later, he accepted an invitation to become the principal trial partner of a leading
Portland law firm.
At this juncture, most people might have thought he was busy enough if not far
too busy. Coffin, however, now joined with others to lead a highly successful
movement to reinvigorate Maine’s Democratic Party. This eventually led to his
own election as Congressman from Maine; and after that to a demanding career in
Washington and later in Paris, leading federal agencies that channeled and
administered economic aid to foreign countries.
This mix of academic achievement, military service, solo and firm legal
practice, politics, legislative office, and national and international governmental
decision-making—all occurring while Coffin was still in his forties—provided an
exceptionally broad and varied background that enriched his perception and
judgment later in life when serving as a federal appellate judge. The overseas work
15. LIFE AND TIMES: VOLUME 3, supra note 5, at 174.
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deepened and informed his later understanding of Puerto Rico, an important part of
the First Circuit with a Spanish and civil law, rather than English common law,
background. Many of the First Circuit’s cases, moreover, involved issues
pertaining to government, legislation, and administrative law, as to which Coffin’s
previous occupations were relevant.
I scarcely realized when I was first appointed to the First Circuit Court how
vast and wide-ranging my new senior partner’s previous experience had been.
Looking back now on his good sense, human as well as legal judgment, and allround competence, I can see how this background contributed to the insight and
skills Judge Coffin brought to bear.
II. MORE ABOUT THE CIRCUIT COURTS AND THE FIRST CIRCUIT OF THE ‘70S
In the 1970s, the First Circuit could still smugly take pride in its complete lack
of need for the en banc hearings to which other circuits resorted when questions
arose that divided their judges and could not be resolved by a single three-judge
panel. We three active judges were usually both the hearing panel and the “banc”;
as a practical matter, we controlled our circuit’s precedent without need for further
hearings, unlike the multiple panels of other circuits. Once a New York lawyer,
whose appeal we had just decided against his client, demanded an en banc as a
matter of right, and remained incredulous and scornful when we pointed out that
the panel of Coffin, McEntee, and Campbell had spoken, leaving no other “banc”
for him to address.
Many aspects of our court’s unique sense of smallness survived the
appointment of our fourth judge, Judge Breyer in 1980, and continued well into,
and beyond, the appointments of Judge Juan Torruella from Puerto Rico in 1984
and Judge Bruce Selya from Rhode Island in 1986, which doubled our number of
judges. Growth, however, had its consequences, even if not immediately apparent.
Court enlargement inevitably meant, as Judge Coffin pointed out in his writings,
fewer opportunities in a given period for the same judges to sit together. And new
screening procedures and a growing staff further altered the court’s institutional
culture. More staff improved efficiency by taking on responsibilities formerly
handled by judges, but at the cost of spreading around, and to a degree
bureaucratizing, those responsibilities. En banc procedures and hearings now had
to be established; and it became routine for a losing appellant to petition, if in most
instances unsuccessfully, for en banc review. The time on panels spent by a given
judge with a particular colleague was halved. On the bright side, the collegial style
characterizing the Coffin years continued. Relative to other circuits, the First
Circuit remained the smallest, and, one might assume, the least bureaucratic. Still,
with today’s six active judges, a clerk’s office with twenty-nine employees, and
some twenty-three staff attorneys, the court has become a very different institution
from the one with three judges, a clerk, and some three or four assistants over
which Coffin assumed leadership in 1972.
Originally—when in 1891 the Evarts Act first created the present national
arrangement of circuit courts of appeals (using the label “circuit” although judges
no longer rode circuit)—each of the newly-created circuits was given a single
hearing panel of three judges. But population growth and other factors caused
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caseloads to rise, so that by the time Judge Coffin became Chief Judge in 1972,
Congress had added more appellate judgeships to every circuit court, excepting
only the First Circuit. In all circuits, the hearing panels remained at three judges,
but with more judges available, more panels could be created and more cases
heard. By 1972, the largest circuit court of appeals, the Fifth Circuit, had fifteen
authorized judges, a size deemed so unwieldy that in 1980 the Fifth Circuit was
split into two parts, with a new Eleventh Circuit created from part of the old Fifth.
A similar split never took place of the Ninth Circuit, which in 1972 had thirteen
judgeships, and today has the astonishing number of twenty-nine authorized
judgeships. Nearby circuit courts in the Northeast, the Second and Third Circuits,
had nine authorized judgeships each in 1972.
The First Circuit remained with but three authorized judges until 1978.
Through the late 1960s and into the first years of the 1970s, its caseload was easily
handled by a single panel—as was apparently true before that, since, as early as in
1918, a Senate Report gave the First Circuit’s low caseload as a reason for adding
Puerto Rico to it (the other reason were the already-established lines of
communication between Boston and Puerto Rico).16
By the mid-‘70s, however, the caseload of the First Circuit was trending
upwards at what soon became an alarming rate.17 The yearly increase continued
into the ‘80s, and our once-comfortable court of three judges soon became, much
as Judge Coffin had foreseen, a court of six judges.
III. ABOUT COLLEAGUES AND FACILITIES ON THE COFFIN COURT
As said, when I joined the First Circuit, my colleagues besides Chief Judge
Coffin were Judge McEntee and Senior Judge Aldrich. Thereafter, Judge McEntee
was succeeded by Judge Bownes, and in 1980 our fourth judge was Judge Breyer.
Let me say a word about each, and about our remarkable clerk, Dana Gallup.
Judge Aldrich had come to the First Circuit in 1959 after serving for some
years on the Massachusetts federal district court bench. Before that he had been a
trial partner with the venerable Boston law firm of Choate, Hall & Stewart. From
the day he joined the First Circuit, Judge Coffin had the highest regard for Judge
Aldrich. He was impressed with Judge Aldrich’s combination of brightness and
judicial and legal experience. Judge Coffin came to regard him as his mentor
during his own early years on the First Circuit bench.
Tall and crane-like in appearance, with a penchant for wearing bow-ties, Judge
16. H.R. Doc. No. 1182, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) (“Porto [sic] Rico is attached to the first circuit,
because there is less business pending there than in any other circuit court of appeals, and because there
are established lines of communication between Porto [sic] Rico and our North Atlantic seaports.”).
17. When Judge Coffin joined the Court in 1965, there were 210 new filings. ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1965 99, 158 (1966). In 1972, when he became chief, there
were 421 filings. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, MANAGEMENT
STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES COURTS: 1975 1 (1975). By 1983, when he stepped down, this number
had grown to 1,008. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
WORKLOAD STATISTICS DURING THE PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1984 3 (1984). By 2010, that
number had almost doubled again to 1,715 new filings. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2010 21 (2010).
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Aldrich was quick and bright, with a wry, sometimes even boyish sense of humor.
A former Harvard Law Review editor (a post which in his day meant being at the
very top of one’s class), he had himself, by all accounts, been a superb trial and
appellate advocate. Judge Aldrich was good-natured with his colleagues and went
out of his way to be helpful to them, as I quickly discovered. But when sitting on
the bench, he did not hesitate to speak sharply to attorneys he thought unprepared
or whose argument he found weak. He expected lawyers to prepare well and to be
able to stand up to, and not be thrown off by, heavy judicial fire. If a lawyer
responded convincingly, Aldrich was not above changing direction, even
apologizing if persuaded he was wrong, but woe to the lawyer who tried to make
up by flattery or evasion.
Judge Aldrich’s courtroom style was more aggressive than Judge Coffin’s.
Except in rare circumstances, where an attorney was rude or blatantly incompetent,
Judge Coffin tended to be low key. In the fifteen or twenty minutes typically given
each side (in some instances reduced to ten and very occasionally increased to a
half hour), attorneys were expected to come quickly to the point, and to be ready to
answer questions from the bench. Judge Coffin wrote many years later that, since
his own early years on the court, the “pace and temper of argument have picked
up” and that there is now an “unarticulated consensus that being a ‘hot’ court, i.e., a
court that is well-prepared, constantly peppers the lawyers with hard questions and
eagerly joins in vigorous debate, is the model of choice.”18 Judge Coffin accepted
this approach only to a point. He felt that “the heat can be overdone.”19 Judge
Coffin’s questions, politely put, were to the point, and he did not hesitate to follow
up with further questions. But he listened to the attorney’s response and took care
to allow the attorney time to argue along lines of his or her choosing.
Returning to Judge Aldrich, he delighted in Admiralty cases, of which the
court still received some, notwithstanding Boston’s decline as a major port. An
experienced sailor and navigator, Judge Aldrich was especially well acquainted
with Admiralty procedure and law. Aldrich also liked patent cases, but appeals
from these were soon diverted from all federal appellate courts, including ours, to
the Federal Circuit in Washington, D.C. Judge Aldrich’s opinions were written in
his own terse, unforgettable style. Unlike the amalgams of judge and law clerk
input, which make up many—perhaps most—judges’ written opinions today, Judge
Aldrich’s could have been written from beginning to end by no one but himself.
Judge Aldrich was deeply committed to serving the court. As soon as the
opportunity arose, he unselfishly elected to take senior status—an option for judges
eligible to retire as an alternative to simply staying on in active status or ceasing all
judicial work. By so doing, he surrendered his position as chief judge and the
prestige and status linked to being an active judge. In return, he could hear and
decide cases on a reduced schedule, and the First Circuit obtained the benefit of a
vacancy filled by appointment of a new full-time judge. Judge Aldrich continued
to come to his chambers in the Boston courthouse, sat frequently on the Court of
Appeals (thereby enlarging its ability to cope with the growing caseload), and—to
help district judges—sometimes tried cases in the district court. Until in his
18. LIFE AND TIMES: VOLUME 3, supra note 5, at 28.
19. Id.
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nineties, Judge Aldrich voluntarily continued to perform judicial duties.
Judge Aldrich’s guidance was an enormous help to me during the period after I
first joined the court. I had been a state trial judge and, for less than a year, a
federal district judge, but I had much to learn about my new job on the First
Circuit. Judge Aldrich’s office was just down the hall from mine, and I dropped by
on many occasions when in need of advice. When interlocutory issues arose during
these early years—such as a party’s request for bail pending appeal or for an
injunction pending appeal—he would often join me, and the two of us would hear
the attorneys informally in my chambers and then telephone and decide the matter
in consultation with Chief Judge Coffin. Judge Aldrich declined, however, to
continue to involve himself in the administration of the First Circuit. This reticence
did not extend to offering occasional unsolicited views about judicial matters—if
he read one of our opinions in which he had not participated, and which he thought
violated canons of good writing or circuit policy, he might circulate a
memorandum saying so. I remember one such memo, condemning an opinion as
overstocked with would-be legal scholarship serving no purpose other than to
sound “scholarly.”
Judge Edward McEntee, the third active judge who had served with Judge
Coffin since 1965, was a large, gray-haired, avuncular man. He was kind and
friendly, but did not talk a great deal. We discovered that he had a fund of funny
stories. This came to light in Puerto Rico when, at a meeting of a bar group, he
was asked to say a few words while we waited for the guest speaker. His remarks
were a succession of hilarious stories, each funnier than the one before. He
explained that in earlier days before becoming a judge, he had had the duty of
“warming up” audiences at political rallies until the governor or other heavyweight
showed up to give the main address.
Judge Coffin later described McEntee as having had “a broad, earthy, peopleoriented experience, a serious dedication to his judicial mission, an openness to
[helpful and worthwhile] suggestions,” and “an instinct for fairness”—as well as a
“quiet integrity.”20 Judge Coffin liked Judge McEntee and it was clear his liking
was reciprocated. Because his date of appointment preceded that of Coffin,
McEntee would in normal course have become chief judge after Judge Aldrich, but
he declined the position—a sensible action, as it turned out, given his precarious
health, but not something a less thoughtful and selfless man would necessarily have
done.
Sadly, his health deteriorated, and he resigned in 1976 and died several years
later. He was replaced by Judge Hugh Bownes, who had for some years been New
Hampshire’s sole federal district judge. This was still the period when some of the
federal districts within the First Circuit, each coterminous with a single state, had
but one district judge. Judge Edward Gignoux was the sole federal district judge
from the District of Maine, and Judge Bownes the sole district judge from the
District of New Hampshire. Rhode Island similarly had Judge Raymond Pettine as
its sole active district judge, although with Judge Edward William Day still
available as a senior judge. With a single federal judge per state, I could not help
sometimes imagining these each as fiefdoms, with Gignoux, Bownes, and Pettine
20. Id. at 30.
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the lords (Not that there was any resemblance in duties or style to the medieval
analogy!). The District of Massachusetts, with the largest caseload, had four
district judgeships, and Puerto Rico, at this time, but two.
Judge Bownes, when he joined our court, brought with him a vast amount of
energy and good humor. His career had included legal practice and a considerable
participation, prior to going on the bench, in New Hampshire municipal
government (he was once the Mayor of Laconia) and Democratic politics. During
World War II he had been a marine, had been wounded and nearly died during the
invasion of Guam, and had received the Silver Star for heroism. I found it
fascinating that he took a kinder view than many judges towards Vietnam draftees
seeking, on grounds of conscientious objection, to avoid military service.
Because there were so few of us during the 1960s and 1970s, the judges of the
Court of Appeals and the district judges within the First Circuit knew each other
well. During this era, it was not uncommon for a so-called three-judge district
court to be convened, a court containing at least one First Circuit judge, in addition
to district judges.21 Such occasions brought judges from both courts together.
Additionally, we would sometimes ask one of the district judges to sit briefly with
the First Circuit, replacing one of the regular appellate judges. Besides supplying
emergency assistance, sitting by designation was a good way for the district judges
to see the world from the perspective of those who (as some put it) “graded their
papers” or, as others said, “came down from the hills to shoot the wounded.” In
fact, as Judge Coffin believed, that was not a bad idea. Seeing the process from the
other court’s perspective helped make its actions less offensive. Relations between
the district judges and the judges of the Coffin Court were cordial, a fact in part
attributable to Judge Coffin’s popularity and courtesy, as well in general to our
closer personal relations.
In 1980, our court received a fourth judge—Stephen Breyer. A professor of
law at Harvard with much Washington experience, he was counsel to the Senate
Judiciary Committee before his appointment. A Cambridge resident like Judge
Aldrich and myself, his permanent courthouse chambers were in Boston. Judge
Breyer brought considerable ability (and, like Judge Coffin, a fine sense of humor)
to the court. Proficient and easy to work with, he was especially expert in
Administrative and Anti-Trust Law and had participated extensively in legislative
drafting. He biked to the courthouse daily. He was lithe, well-conditioned and
active, and possessed a good teacher’s finely tuned rhetoric and a very quick mind.
A final member of the Coffin Court needs mention—our extraordinary clerk,
Dana Gallup. He was the glue that held us all together. One could daily find Mr.
Gallup (in working relations, we referred to him as “Mr.”; he called us each
“Judge,” though first names were used when off duty) standing at the clerk’s office
counter in the Boston Courthouse where he regularly spoke with attorneys having
matters before the court. Tall, with graying hair and strong, rugged features, he
knew every lawyer and every pro-se litigant, and served all with dignity and
21. At that time, a three-judge district court was required in all cases seeking to declare acts of the
state or federal legislatures unconstitutional. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281–82 (repealed 1976). Today, such
courts are only necessary when “an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment
of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.” 28 U.S.C. § 2284
(2006).
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kindness. Gallup was the First Circuit’s trusted go-between. We judges could not
deal directly with lawyers and parties having cases before us. Mr. Gallup was the
essential connector in all matters where advice and communication were needed.
He explained to counsel what motions might be appropriate, how to write them,
and how to interpret the court’s sometimes opaque orders (which he likely wrote),
exercising diplomacy and skill in what he told the parties as to their case’s
scheduling and posture, and in what he reported back to us, while preserving both
the appearance and fact of fairness and propriety. Dana Gallup was himself a
capable lawyer; he had begun working for the court when still in law school,
following his return from military service. Being married with a family, he stayed
with the court rather than going into the practice of law as had his father. As
assistant clerk, he understudied Clerk Roger A. Stinchfield, a legendary
predecessor appointed in the 1920s. Mr. Gallup became clerk when the latter’s
health failed. Gallup was by then expert in all that he needed to know about the
procedural side of federal appellate practice. He drafted, in consultation with the
writing judge, our court’s orders at the time opinions were issued. He was as much
trusted by members of the bar as by the judges of the court. He and Chief Judge
Coffin worked closely together.
During the Coffin Court years, we were the only circuit left that had yet to fill
the recently created position of circuit executive. Because Chief Judge Coffin and
the rest of us were so highly pleased with the services of Mr. Gallup as our clerk
and believed that—at least until the court was larger—the administration of the
First Circuit did not need supplementation at the top, we declined to bring in
someone senior to him. Washington for some years was reluctant to endorse the
appointment of court clerks as circuit executives—a reluctance that ended in the
early ‘80s, allowing us finally to appoint Mr. Gallup to this position.
Dana Gallup was indeed a paragon—someone with every qualification our
court could have sought in its most senior clerk—and fortunately, there he was
before our eyes, leaving us with no need to look further.
IV. WHERE THE JUDGES WORKED
In 1965, when first appointed, Judge Coffin established his chambers in the
federal courthouse in Portland, Maine, and bought a home in South Portland. He
drove during the first week of each month to Boston (except during the summer
and during the February sitting in Puerto Rico), staying in a Boston hotel for a few
nights and working those days at the Boston Courthouse where appeals were each
day argued before a panel of three judges. The visits to Boston were the times
when the judges were all together, not only to hear the scheduled appeals but
(except for Senior Judge Aldrich) to discuss and decide administrative matters and
anything else that needed their collective presence.
The Boston courtroom, unlike the rest of the court’s quarters, was spacious and
even elegant with its portraits of former judges, soon to be supplemented by
Gardiner Cox’s exceptional portrait of Judge Aldrich and, later, by Judge Coffin’s
fine portrait painted by Marion Miller. During hearings, Judge Coffin presided,
sitting in the middle between Judge McEntee and me. Sometimes the panel
included Judge Aldrich and omitted one of us. In such a situation, if Chief Judge
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Coffin was not on the panel, the next most senior active judge would preside (as a
senior judge, Judge Aldrich could not preside). Clerk Dana Gallup sat at a desk in
front of the bench, and there was usually a younger assistant, often a night law
student, who called out for all to rise when the judges entered and took their seats.
We usually heard five or six cases during a single day, ending at lunch-time or, on
occasion, hearing one or two appeals after lunch. The panel and any other
appellate judge available in the courthouse would have lunch together, usually at a
non-fancy nearby restaurant.
For judges like Coffin and McEntee (and later Judge Bownes), whose working
chambers were out of state, Boston provided tiny rooms, sparely furnished, as
“visiting” chambers. These were barely sufficient to fit the judge, an occasional
secretary, and a law clerk. Judge Aldrich, Judge Breyer, and I, being
Massachusetts residents, commuted daily from our homes to what were our
principal chambers at the Boston Courthouse. Judge Aldrich had a surprisingly
large office, but his law clerk and secretary had less space than desirable. My own
chambers had a relatively small office, a small secretarial space, and a book-lined
larger room barely sufficient for my two, later three, law clerks. Judge Aldrich,
some time after I came aboard, offered me his office, a kind offer I refused because
it seemed unthinkable to accept.
That courthouse, soon to be named the McCormick Courthouse after the
Speaker of the House and located between Congress and Devonshire Streets, was
nothing like today’s spacious and modern Moakley Courthouse, located on Boston
Harbor. Originally designed to house all federal officers, judges and agencies in
Boston—at a time when the entire federal entourage was a fraction of what it is
today—the accommodations in the McCormick Courthouse for the Court of
Appeals and the Massachusetts District Court were spare and somewhat cramped.
But the lack of grandiosity seemed acceptable at the time. We judges and our
frugal clerk, Dana Gallup, had been brought up in post-depression years and had
lived through a World War. Moreover, as New Englanders, we were from a
tradition that did not value show. Times and values would soon change but, so
long as the space was sufficient for the work at hand, we found nothing out of line
about these sparse accommodations.
V. FUNCTIONING OF THE JUDGES
The monthly assignment of particular judges and cases to panels, and the
distribution of records and briefs to judges in advance of hearings, were left to the
Clerk’s Office. To avoid partiality or any appearance of partiality, judges did not
determine which cases they would hear. During any month that Judge Aldrich was
sitting, some of the three-judge panels would include him and omit one of the
active judges. After lawyers had argued all the day’s cases before the assigned
panel, the judges would confer privately in the courtroom lobby, with Judge Coffin
(or, if he was away, the most senior active judge) presiding.
We would discuss the cases just heard in order, with each judge being asked
for his opinion and comments. Often the panel members would vote to affirm the
decision below; less often the consensus was for reversal or remand; occasionally
differing views as to outcome would be expressed; and sometimes, if the case was
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complex, the judges would indicate uncertainty as to outcome, leaving it to the
writing judge to embody his own conclusions in the draft opinion which members
of the panel would later review to determine whether or not they agreed. It was
always understood, even when a judge voted to affirm or reverse, that votes at this
stage were tentative and could be modified later on when the draft was circulated.
Chief Judge Coffin made the final writing assignments after all cases for the
month had been heard and discussed. He engaged in the assignment process with
great deliberation, balancing each judge’s workload so that no one would be
conspicuously overloaded, and also taking into account what case or cases he
believed a particular judge might find interesting, or even fun, to write. He was
delighted when a judge was well satisfied with his assignment—a maritime case
being found for Judge Aldrich, for example. Occasionally, cases would come
along where Judge Coffin felt it right for him, as the chief judge, to write the
opinion—for example, a seminal Boston school-busing case where the court
wished to indicate its attention and unanimity. But these cases were few and far
between. Judge Coffin often assigned important and interesting cases to others
rather than keeping them for himself. And, of course, in the few instances where
the panel seemed divided, the writing assignment usually went to a judge who was
in the majority.
In retrospect, I realize how much Coffin’s fairness and care in the assignment
process were key ingredients for the happy and collegial court we were. Judge
Coffin’s visible and painstaking efforts when assigning cases to be fair to and
considerate of judges on the panel—keeping in mind, at the same time, the court’s
overall interests—contributed significantly to morale and to our respect for him.
His efforts were reciprocated by the judges’ eagerness to cooperate with him
whenever mutual tasks needed to be done.
After the cases were assigned, the members of the court split up and, if not
from Massachusetts, went back to their home districts. I would lose no time in
telling my law clerks what cases we were to write, and I would relay to them our
tentative decisions and any comments from the judges’ conference relevant to cases
we had a part in. Other cases, from earlier sittings, would, of course, be already in
the pipeline in various stages of completion. Priorities had to be set so that our
chambers’ production line was as efficient as possible. Often cases that were not
too complex and were to be affirmed were targeted for a speedy draft.
Different judges’ chambers handled the writing of draft opinions differently.
Judge Coffin’s books make clear that, in writing his drafts, he valued and enjoyed
his law clerks’ collaboration. I would typically discuss the draft in detail with one
of my law clerks, and, unless a further legal research memo was required, would
ask for a proposed draft opinion from the clerk. I then most often rewrote that draft
in its entirety, although sometimes, in less complex cases, utilized more or less in
full as the circulated draft if I thought it sufficient. Judge Aldrich worked
differently—writing a first draft himself, and then asking his clerk to provide
citations and criticism. In the end, however composed, a draft was produced with
which the writing judge was satisfied, and circulated to the writer’s two colleagues.
In today’s computerized world, drafts can be worked on back and forth from a
judge’s computer and one or more clerks’ computers, leaving a judge’s secretary
with little to do in that realm. In those earlier days, our secretaries would take
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charge of typing the finished product and would mail the draft to the other judges
along with the writing judge’s letter of transmittal. Usually, the letter would
contain few comments, but sometimes—if the opinion deviated from what had
earlier been discussed or the judges had yet to agree on the result even
tentatively—the letter of transmittal might contain a fairly lengthy explanation or
apologia for the draft.
In a day or two the other two judges would receive the draft and letter—
today’s near instantaneous delivery had yet to be possible. In many instances, their
responses would be a quick letter saying “I am pleased to concur,” sometimes
accompanied by small suggestions for spelling or word changes, sometimes with
more ambitious changes to suggest. It was generally assumed the writing judge
had stylistic liberty. Judges did not bicker over matters of style or ways of putting
things that did not involve issues of substance. But, substantively, the opinion was
regarded as that of the entire panel. Hence if, beyond matters of expression
deemed relatively unimportant, the opinion struck a panel member’s nerve, either
because it seemed incorrect in its statements of the facts or law, had an improper
tone, or otherwise conveyed the wrong message, the non-writing judges would say
so in their replies. If the changes were small, or at least acceptable, the writing
judge would usually welcome the corrections, would write back he had made them,
and would attach a copy of the revised opinion, after which all would happily sign
off. But more extensive and serious criticisms might result in considerable
correspondence in which each of the three judges took a position.22 Quite often,
agreement was eventually reached. In rare instances, one of the judges would write
a dissenting opinion or, if the disagreement was with the reasoning but not the
result, a concurrence.
Our small court had little difficulty agreeing on most occasions, but we had
some dissents and concurrences.23 Quite often, even if one judge disagreed with
aspects of the writing judge’s opinion, he would not write separately unless
persuaded that there was good reason to do so and that a separate opinion would
not do harm rather than good. A court of appeals, unlike the Supreme Court, does
not choose its cases; they come in a continuous flood, and small or even sometimes
large differences of opinion concerning a particular issue are often not usefully
preserved in the published decisions of the court. It is desirable for the court’s
precedent to provide clear guidance as to how the court interprets the law; hence in
many situations acceptance by the entire panel of the majority’s view may be
preferable to a disagreeing judge’s writing separately and perhaps muddying the
22. See, e.g., The Levin Campbell Papers (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Box 3)
(extensive correspondence among Chief Judge Coffin, Judge Campbell, and Judge McEntee, in which
Chief Judge Coffin allayed both other judges’ concerns over a difficult torts case, and created
consensus, leading to a unanimous per curiam opinion).
23. LexisNexis shows only seventy-two concurrences and seventy-five dissents over the eleven
years of the Coffin Court. By Judge, the number of dissents was: Campbell (28), Coffin (19), Bownes
(14), Aldrich (7), Breyer (5), McEntee (2). Dissents by Coffin Court Judges, LEXISNEXIS,
www.lexisnexis.com (select First Circuit database for date range 1/1/1972-12/31/1983; then search
Dissent by (insert name of judge) for each judge). The number of concurrences was: Campbell (37),
Aldrich (15), Coffin (9), Bownes (5), Breyer (4), McEntee (2). Concurrences by Coffin Court Judges,
LEXISNEXIS, www.lexisnexis.com (select First Circuit database for date range 1/1/1972-12/31/1983;
then search Concur by (insert name of judge) for each judge).
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message. Sometimes, of course, the divisive issue may be one that some day will
come before the Supreme Court or, at least, before other circuit courts. In such
instances, it may be useful for a disagreeing judge to preserve his views in a
published dissent or separate opinion.
There was no rancor in the judges’ dealings with each other on the Coffin
Court. Judge Coffin set an example of courtesy and understanding in his
interactions with the rest of us. This does not mean that in discussions concerning
cases under advisement, he, or any of us, abandoned fundamental positions that we
believed were valid. But Coffin and the rest of us were willing to listen to our
colleagues and often to reconsider views in light of theirs; and Coffin encouraged
the exploration of alternative approaches, changes to language, and the avoidance
of unessential divisive issues as a way of achieving unanimity. Coffin’s approach
was to assume for as long as reasonably possible that the panel could find common
ground, and, if necessary, to stake out the common ground himself.
In one case, for instance, Judge Coffin faced what appeared to be an intractable
disagreement between myself and Judge McEntee over a difficult choice of law
analysis.24 His first reaction was to “spen[d] considerable time agonizing over
[the] good exchange of memos.”25 He then proceeded to suggest that Judge
McEntee and I were “comparing how many angels can stand on the head of each of
two pins,”26 and proposed a slightly modified analysis. Still unsatisfied with the
choice of law analysis, I circulated a memo, telling Judges Coffin and McEntee that
I planned to write a separate concurring opinion. In response, Judge Coffin rewrote a portion of Judge McEntee’s opinion, confining the previous disagreement
to a footnote. He accompanied this revision with a memorandum that read:
[I]t seems to me . . . that it would be rather silly to have a split opinion on a case
where we agree on the result and don’t disagree very much as to approach . . . . I
don’t want to brush under the rug any strong conviction which either of you have
but felt that the case might be looked upon as significant by some courts and that
27
our differences could be reflected in a footnote such as I recommend.

Both Judge McEntee and I accepted this approach and, in a memo sent to
myself and Judge Coffin, Judge McEntee remarked: “Thank you both again for
your outstanding efforts in this case. I suggest that this truly collegial opinion be
designated ‘Per Curiam.’”28
I should add that the memos we exchanged were seldom couched in excited
argumentative style but most often were careful, moderate, and “legal” in tone.
And we made efforts to improve, as we saw it, a colleague’s draft in the interest of

24. The Levin Campbell Papers, Memorandum from Judge McEntee to Judge Campbell, cc Chief
Judge Coffin (Apr. 18, 1975) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Box 3).
25. The Levin Campbell Papers, Memorandum from Chief Judge Coffin to Judges Campbell and
McEntee (Apr. 25, 1975) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Box 3).
26. Id.
27. The Levin Campbell Papers, Memorandum from Chief Judge Coffin to Judges Campbell and
McEntee (May 16, 1975) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Box 3).
28. The Levin Campbell Papers, Memorandum from Judge McEntee to Chief Judge Coffin and
Judge Campbell (May 22, 1975) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Box 3).
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achieving a better product, quite apart from a different bottom-line outcome29—an
approach Coffin later would write was most likely when panel members knew one
another well and were truly “collegial.” This collegial, consensus-building
approach, while part of our daily working environment on the Coffin Court, was
even more remarkable to the visiting judges who sometimes joined our panels.
Thus, Judge Frank Murray of the District of Massachusetts, after witnessing a
lengthy exchange of memoranda between Judge Coffin and myself on a complex
government hiring discrimination case—which ended in a unanimous opinion—
wrote: “I think that the benefits of collegiality were most ably demonstrated by the
process you and Lee have moved toward resolution of the sticky application of the
prima-facie case point to the above captioned case.”30
The First Circuit judges of that time almost never discussed orally opinions in
progress, either in person or on the telephone. Views about what to say when
deciding a particular case were exchanged by written memos and letters. Quite
often, if a judge wished to have certain language changed, he would propose the
actual new language, perhaps accompanied by a modest disclaimer along the lines
that “I am sending you this changed language just to show you what I have in
mind—feel free to use your own language if you are willing to go along.”31 By
spelling out the solution to a particular concern, we made it much easier for the
writer to know what we had in mind. The danger of this approach—that the
writer’s pride of authorship would be wounded—was lessened by knowing each
other well and by leaving the wording to him.
Judge Coffin wrote in his memoirs that he could not:
[O]veremphasize the positive effect that the tiny size of our court had on our
general unanimity . . . . This meant that we sat together most of the time, reasoned
together, sometimes gaining a point, sometimes losing. And we were always open
with each other. We never tried, in cases of disagreement by one colleague, to
persuade a colleague privately to side with oneself. All memos went to both
32
colleagues.

Judge Coffin went on that it “was not surprising that many opinions could be
redrafted slightly to avoid our colleague’s problem, without sacrificing basic
principle . . . . In short, collegiality was at its zenith.”33
Judge Coffin discusses in his memoirs whether he had a “judicial philosophy,”
by which I suspect he meant some overarching concept by which to decide cases.
He wrote that he initially regretted the lack of such a philosophy, but concluded
29. See, e.g., The Levin Campbell Papers, Memorandum from Chief Judge Coffin to Judge Aldrich,
cc Judge Campbell (July 13, 1977) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Box 3) (“I have three
kinds of suggestions . . . . All are submitted with the goal of making an already brilliant and important
analysis as invulnerable as possible to criticism of those who would want to be critical.”).
30. The Levin Campbell Papers, Memorandum from Judge Murray to Chief Judge Coffin, cc Judge
Campbell (Nov. 24, 1981) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Box 21).
31. See, e.g., The Levin Campbell Papers, Memorandum from Chief Judge Coffin to Judge
Campbell, cc Judge Bownes (July 24, 1979) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Box 10)
(Judge Coffin wrote: “I return the ribbon to you so you may make the couple of corrections suggested
by Hugh.” Handwritten after "corrections" was "—if you want to—.").
32. LIFE AND TIMES: VOLUME 3, supra note 5, at 123-24.
33. Id. at 124.
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that “no one theory fitted all” and, in general, disclaimed having any one-size-fitsall approach.34 He agreed with Learned Hand’s view of judges as “jobbists,”35
meaning, he wrote, that a judge must understand the facts in a given case; know the
pertinent law; “keep an eye cocked on the purpose of sensible policy;” “try to
forward that policy without doing violence to what has been understood in the
past;” and “make clear the reasons for the decision.”36 In the period from his
appointment in 1965 until he stepped down as chief judge in 1983, Judge Coffin
himself wrote 1,765 opinions, and, of course, thereafter, many more. My
impression is that the above “jobbist” formulation best describes his overall
approach in those opinions and it probably also reasonably describes that of his
colleagues on the court.
I can remember no discussion among First Circuit judges that showed a strong
political or ideological turn. None of us were of a nature, I think, to approach
questions in a rigidly ideological way. One might say that Judge Coffin seemed
content with constitutional interpretations such as those of Justice Brennan, who
was our circuit justice and a good friend of Judge Coffin’s, and of the Warren
Court majority in general. But, like the rest of us, he studied each case on its own
merits and endeavored fairly to follow precedent, regardless of personal preference.
And of course many, if not most, of our cases involved issues other than ones
giving rise to the sort of constitutional or statutory questions that could lead to
political or ideological division. We received from time to time cases presenting
hot button issues of constitutional interpretation; but if these were not largely
controlled already by existing Supreme Court rulings, one could reasonably predict
they were headed for the Supreme Court, where the final word would be spoken.
Except for Judge Aldrich and me, the judges of that era were Democrats.
Judge Aldrich and I, by contrast, both came from moderate Republican
backgrounds. Judge Coffin, Judge Bownes, and I had served in the armed forces,
and all of us had lived through World War II, leaving us, I think, far less prone than
people are today to disparage another’s politics or question his patriotism. That
said, in cases where there was room for choice, I more often tended to what might
be described as more conservative positions on criminal and some social matters
than Judge Coffin and probably my other colleagues as well. Still, in most
situations, we were not uncomfortable with one another’s views and, regardless of
any personal beliefs, undertook to interpret the law in a lawyerly way, even when
the outcome was not personally to our liking. Legal realism or the more modern
school of critical legal studies were certainly not our cups of tea.
VI. GOING TO PUERTO RICO
Our court’s annual February sitting in Puerto Rico deserves mention. It was
important for at least two reasons: first, because it allowed us to get to know Puerto
Rico with a colonial background rooted, before the turn of the Century, in Spanish
rule, and a unique legal and cultural history very different from that of mainland
United States (and, not being a state, a different political status from the other parts
34. Id. at 40.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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of the First Circuit). Second, during our seven or eight days in Puerto Rico, the
judges, our clerk Dana Gallup, and our wives, had an opportunity to get to know
one another on a personal level better than at any other time, thus promoting the
collegiality which was the Coffin hallmark.
Along with our wives, all three active judges, together with Mr. Gallup and his
wife, flew from Boston to San Juan for a February sitting there. Judge Aldrich did
not come. It was not the practice in the 1970s to bring our law clerks to Puerto
Rico—why, I don’t quite know. Judge Coffin wanted us all to stay at the same
hotel; so, to accommodate Dana Gallup’s smaller expense allowance, we all opted
to stay at the less fashionable Dutch Inn rather than the grander San Juan Hilton.
This way we operated socially as one group, attending almost all functions and
dinners together from arrival (usually Friday night) until the court session ended
the following Thursday. Togetherness of this sort worked when the court was
small and when Coffin was our leader; subsequently, the new judges coming to
Puerto Rico elected to stay at different hotels, interest in a common agenda having
faded. I should mention that in the ‘70s and thereafter, Coffin (like his successors
later on) often persuaded a federal judge from outside the First Circuit to join our
panel in Puerto Rico to help us manage the ever-growing caseload. These judges
generally joined our little social group, along with their wives, adding much to the
collegiality of the Puerto Rican visits.
Chief Judge Coffin was deeply interested in the politics and culture of Puerto
Rico. He made and maintained close friendships with several members of the
Puerto Rican judiciary, besides coming to know, as did all of us, the federal district
judges there. My wife Eleanor and I shared the Coffins’ interest in Puerto Rico and
were pleased to be included in the Coffins’ circle of Puerto Rican friends. A ritual
during our visit to Puerto Rico was a dinner reception hosted by the Puerto Rico
chapter of the Federal Bar Association. After our four days of hearing appeals in
San Juan, the Coffins and ourselves made a practice of visiting and often travelling
around the Island with particular Puerto Rican friends who introduced us to
interesting places, and discoursed about the politics, history, art, and many other
aspects of life in Puerto Rico. These outings gave us an appreciation of the charm
of the island and its people, as well as of the many problems.
To hear the appeals, we used a courtroom and antechamber provided by the
Chief Judge of the District Court next to his own office. To set up the hearings,
Mr. Gallup—who declined to use taxis or more expensive transportation—early
each morning took a local bus from our hotel to the federal courthouse in San Juan,
then located in an historic Spanish-style building on the harbor of the old city. The
judges arrived an hour or so later, usually driven by United States Marshals. At the
beginning of the week, a large crowd of attorneys would come to the courtroom to
be sworn in to the bar of the First Circuit. Thereafter, the arguments would
proceed much the same as in Boston, usually by local attorneys, although
occasionally by attorneys from mainland United States. The language was English,
in which the local attorneys were, for the most part, admirably fluent.
At lunchtime, we judges would go to a nearby restaurant, and later in the
afternoon, after we discussed the day’s cases, we would return to our hotel, connect
with our wives, and engage in some joint social plan for dinner, often followed, in
the case of the judges, by a late-night reading of tomorrow’s cases. We were often
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invited to dine with the Puerto Rico District Court’s Chief Judge Toledo and his
wife, and with one or another of the district judges, and sometimes with justices of
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court. One of the district judges, Juan Torruella, later
joined us on the First Circuit. The Puerto Rican federal district judges—as is true
to this day—were excellent lawyers and totally bilingual. The latter ability was as
essential as it was remarkable. While their first language was Spanish, the federal
court proceedings they ran, including all pleadings, briefs, arguments, and
testimony, as well as their opinions, were necessarily in English.
When I first went to Puerto Rico in 1973, all appeals from within that
jurisdiction were ordinarily heard in the First Circuit’s single yearly sitting in San
Juan—a practice that must have begun soon after World War II when, thanks to
improved air travel, a regular sitting by the Boston Court in Puerto Rico became
feasible. The number of appeals, small at first, was just beginning to increase in
the early 1970s. In 1973, the list was large enough to keep our panel busy for three
days. In subsequent years, spurred by the popularity of Puerto Rico’s own district
court, the numbers kept rising. Toward the end of the 1970s, after being worn
down by a list so long we had to sit mornings and afternoons of each day, we began
placing Puerto Rican appeals on the Boston list for hearing there. The court
continued, however, to come to Puerto Rico for at least one annual session, in order
to keep in touch with the judges and the bar there.
For Judge and Ruth Coffin, and for Eleanor and me, these annual visits, with
the chance to work in a place we greatly enjoyed and to renew acquaintanceship
with Puerto Rican friends, remained a particular pleasure and a unique opportunity.
VII. COLLEGIALITY
Collegiality, as experienced by the judges on the Coffin Court, was very much
a fact during the period in question, not just a theory. Never having been on
another multi-judge court, I took for granted our agreeably close and collaborative
way of working together, perhaps thinking it more typical of the relationships on
courts like ours than, in fact, was necessarily so. Now, looking back, the
consensus-building leadership of Judge Coffin was plainly a major contributor to
the court’s positive and friendly culture, as were the cooperative responses of the
other judges. We greatly enjoyed working with Judge Coffin and with one another.
At the time, I lacked any nuanced view of why, beyond obvious reasons,
collegiality might be especially important on a multi-judge court like ours. Later,
when reading Coffin’s two books, The Ways of a Judge and On Appeal, I
discovered—as was true of so many other significant matters—that he had thought
deeply about the subject. He saw collegiality as not simply an agreeable quality
but as one that, on a three-judge court, required serious cultivation for professional
reasons.
Judge Coffin viewed collegiality as essential to the quality of the work put out
by the federal courts of appeals. It affects, he wrote, “the flavor, quality, and—at
their best—the wisdom of appellate opinions.”37 The reason three judges were
placed on appellate panels, he believed, was to engage all three minds, not just that

37. THE WAYS OF A JUDGE, supra note 12, at 172.
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of the writing judge, in arriving at the court’s written decisions. Having three
judges blended multiple talents so as to produce a result better than any one judge
could produce. Coffin saw, as he wrote, a vast difference between arriving at a
“yes” or “no” on a particular opinion through majority vote, and “working up an
opinion on a close case so that three or more judges of different sensitivities,
values, and backgrounds can join not only in the result, but in the rationale, tone,
nuances, and reservations.”38
An important, indeed essential, component of the kind of collegiality he
describes is the opportunity of the three judges to know one another well, to have
worked together continuously. He called this “intimacy beyond affection.”39
There must be “a deep . . . selective knowledge of one another.”40 It is particularly
in this respect that the smallness of a court works in its favor. No other institution
(than an appellate court) “reaches this level of intimate, equal, permanent,
independent, and single-minded collegiality.”41 Among the elements of true
collegiality are lack of envy, pettiness, and enmity among the three judges;
openness (meaning “an absence of dissimulation, maneuvering, or exploitation”).
Attempts to convince must be based on “words,” not “ganging up” or “secret twoway deals,” and despite closeness, “one thing that is never asked or given in the
context of judicial duties is a favor.”42
Coffin concedes that the collegiality of an appeals court has drawbacks. An
appellate judge must surrender the autonomy of a trial judge. He or she may even
have to subordinate personal views to achieve a harmony of the whole, although
Coffin recognized that there are times when that should not be done—and need not,
in proper circumstances, spell an end to collegiality.43 He also recognized that
what he says of collegiality on courts of appeal may well be inapplicable to the
different responsibilities of the nine-member Supreme Court of the United States.44
As previously noted, Coffin believed that the collegiality of the federal circuit
courts of appeals was seriously endangered by their growing size. While their
panels remain at three, the composition of each panel becomes subject to constant
turnover when the number of judges on the same court becomes very large. Coffin
pointed out in 1994 that, beyond the First Circuit with its six judges, “all other
twelve federal courts of appeal have ten or more active judges and up to ten senior
judges.”45 In a court of ten judges sitting in panels of three “there are no fewer than
thirty-six different panels on which an individual judge can sit.”46 Judges might
theoretically sit with each colleague once a year, although that seems unlikely in
practice. Ordinarily, “[a] federal appellate judge ends up sitting several times a
38. Id. at 59.
39. Id. at 172.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 171.
42. Id. at 172–73.
43. ON APPEAL, supra note 1, at 224–29 (discussing the role of separate opinions on collegiality in
courts).
44. Compare id. at 224–25, with NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF
FDR'S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (2010) (describing often embittered relationships between four
intractable but gifted and influential Justices of the Supreme Court).
45. ON APPEAL, supra note 1, at 215.
46. Id. at 216.
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year with the same colleagues, once a year with some, and not at all with others.”47
Coffin saw such fragmented relationships as undermining the collegiality he
believed essential—judges never got to know one another’s “strengths, biases and
foibles,” and they lacked motivation to establish the most harmonious relationships,
to cater to particular habits and tasks.”48 Each sitting at such a court “approaches
the convening of a panel of polite strangers.”49
Judge Coffin was aware of the dilemma inherent in his analysis. That dilemma
stemmed from the difficulty of creating courts big enough to handle the nation’s
judicial business without, at the same time, increasing the number of their judges to
a figure incompatible with preserving collegial relationships between individual
judges. Coffin feared that collegiality could soon be “an endangered species,” but
voiced the “fervent hope” that “the qualities associated with smallness may endure
even though smallness itself may not . . . .”50
Certainly the Coffin Court, which I have portrayed here, was our nation’s final
experiment with a federal appellate tribunal of the small size Coffin viewed as
ideal. That court was indeed truly collegial. Judge Coffin’s outstanding leadership
and other favorable factors including its size made it so. One might even say it
justified Coffin’s enthusiastic view of the merits of such a small, collegial body.
Whether its collegiality resulted in judicial products superior to those from some
larger, less congenial court is, of course, another question—one that I am scarcely
in a position to assess. Nor does there seem any easy way to make the objective
evaluation required to answer such a question. What can be said with confidence is
that many of the Coffin Court’s best practices, well described by Coffin in his
writings, remain models today. Even on multi-judge behemoths, collegial
interactions are often practiced and are encouraged. And the legacy of Judge Frank
Coffin lives on. Most any judge, lawyer, or litigant would welcome a man of his
extraordinary caliber to the appellate bench. It is hard to imagine a judge who
better portrayed the qualities and standards all would wish exemplified on our
courts.
There remains to be mentioned one further ingredient of collegiality that was a
hallmark of the Coffin Court—namely, humor. Frank Coffin himself had
extraordinary wit, as well as a great liking for fun.51 All of us on the Coffin Court
enjoyed and responded to this quality in him, and on occasion reciprocated—like
Judge Aldrich, when he sang an ode to Judge Coffin to the tune of “Mack the
Knife.”52 Humor—in particular, the kind with the capacity not to take oneself too
seriously—is a useful solvent when judges, or any group, work together closely.
Humor in no small measure helped make the enterprise I call the Coffin Court truly
collegial.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. THE WAYS OF A JUDGE, supra note 12, at 172.
51. See, e.g., LIFE AND TIMES: VOLUME 3, supra note 5, at 109 (telling of Judge Coffin’s
introduction of the “head table” at a court event: Judge Coffin, after taking the microphone, lifted the
table cloth, reported on the table’s surface, looked under, reported on its legs, and announced he had
introduced the head table).
52. Id. at 167.

